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RECENT DECISIONS
Contracts - Sufficiency of Notice to Passengers of Limitations in Con-
tract of Carriage- Plaintiff, a passenger on defendant's airplane
bought a ticket which contained the provision: "Sold subject to tariff
regulations." At this time there was an effective tariff duly filed and
posted which provided, inter alia, that no action could be maintained for
personal injury to a passenger unless written notice of such claim was
presented to the defendant within thirty days after the injury. Plain-
tiff's action against the defendant company for negligent injury was
not commenced within the time provided. Held: plaintiff's action is
denied. There was sufficient notice to her of the time-limiting provision.
Wilhelmy v. North-West Airlines, 86 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Wash.
1949).
The novel point in the above decision is that one accepting a ticket
subject to tariff regulations would be considered to have notice of limi-
tations on time within which an action may be brought merely because
such limitation was included on the posted list entitled "Tariff Regula-
tions". The word "tariff", as commonly understood, does not seem to
have so extended a scope.
The Court in the instant case seems to base its decision on Jones v.
North-West Airline, Inc.1 where it was held that a passenger buying a
ticket subject to tariff regulations was bound by the tariff duly filed and
posted which exempted the carrier from liability for failure of its planes
to depart and arrive on schedule in spite of a special contract made with
the passenger when he purchased his ticket guaranteeing that he would
arrive at his destination at a particular time.
The general rule states that because it is impossible to imprint on
tickets all of the rules and regulations of tariffs, these rules and regula-
tions must nevertheless be binding upon the carrier and the passenger. 2
However, the word "tariff", interpreting it to the extreme limit for the
purpose of this note, appears to embrace only those matters:
1) contemplated or required by the Interstate Commerce Act to
be therein stated, and
2) which can be properly included in or related to a system of
rates and charges.3
In Boston & Maine v. Hooker4 plaintiff passenger sued carrier for
value of baggage lost through negligence in transporting it from Boston
to Sunapee, N.H. Plaintiff was held bound by a regulation not appear-
ing on the ticket which limited the carrier's liability for passengers' bag-
' Jones v. Northwest Airline, Inc., 22 Wash. 863, 157 P. (2d) 728 (1945).
2 Koontz v. South Surburban Safeway Lines, Inc., 322 Ill., App. 14, 73 N.E.
12d) 919 (1947).
3 Pacific S.S. Co. v. Cackett, 8 F.(2d) 259 (C.C.A. 9th 1925).
4 Boston & Maine Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97 (1914).
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gage because rates for transportation may be directly affected by the
degree of the carrier's responsibility for safe carriage and delivery of
baggage. Under this reasoning posted tariff regulations which in any
way directly limited the amount of money which the carrier could be
called upon to pay out would seem to be matter notice of which the
passenger would properly be held to have. Regulations pertaining to
obligatory routing of passengers or manner of baggage disposition
might conceivably be included in this category. Situations are various
and many. A regulation, however, limiting the time in which an action
might be commenced appears too remote in its effect on the carrier's
rates and charges to reasonably charge a passenger of notice thereof in
the manner undertaken in the instant case. Nor can it be said to be a
matter contemplated or required by the Interstate Commerce Act to be
filed under tariff regulations. The law as pronounced in the present
case would seem to allow the carrier to attach unusual limitations and
conditions, both subsequent and precedent, to the unsuspecting passen-
gers' contract of carriage by merely including them on the posted list
of tariff regulations. This hardly seems desirable.
The case of Pacific SS Co. v. Cackett5 presented a fact situation
similar to the one here discussed. The Court there held specifically that
because giving of notice of claims for damages from negligence had
no perceptible relation to rates and charges for transportation, the
plaintiff did not lose her right of action by failure to comply with car-
rier's regulation pertaining thereto. This case was not cited in the
opinion of the present case.
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Evidence- Scope of Cross-Examination of Juror Witness to Events
in Jury Room -One Burton was on trial for income tax evasion.
LaBranche was called as a juror, examined, accepted, heard the evi-
dence and thereafter was sent to the jury room where he deliberated
with his fellow jurors as to the verdict. The result was a disagreement
and the jury was discharged. This was followed by a criminal action
charging LaBranche and others with conspiracy in that for a sum of
money LaBranche promised to vote for the acquittal of Burton.
The prosecution called Adams who had served as a petit juror
with LaBranche, and asked how LaBranche had voted. Adams an-
swered LaBranche had voted for acquittal throughout the entire pro-
ceedings in the jury room. On cross-examination counsel for La-
Branche asked Adams how the other jurors had voted. The government
objected on grounds of immateriality and irrelevancy, and was sus-
5 Supra, Npte 3.
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